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In this paper we document the maturity structure of firms’ debt in Ecuador and we 
discuss how it has been affected by government intervention in credit markets and 
by financial liberalization. Using firm-level panel data, we then investigate the 
determinants of access to long-term debt. Finally, we provide evidence on the 
impact of the maturity structure of debt on firms’ performance, in particular on 
productivity and capital accumulation. 
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  3  41. Introduction 
 
The theoretical and empirical analysis of firm financing has mainly emphasized the choice of 
debt versus (internal or external) equity.
1  Although the idea of debt as a homogeneous source of 
funds is a powerful theoretical construct and a useful first step, one must go beyond the leverage 
decision and investigate other dimensions of the debt choice. In particular, the nature of debt and 
its incentive properties can differ according, for instance, to its maturity (long and short) and to 
the providers (banks or markets).
2 
  This paper addresses the issue of the maturity structure of firms’ debt and provides some 
empirical evidence for Ecuador.
3  Although the issue of the maturity structure of debt is 
important for both developed and developing countries, there are some aspects of the problem 
that have been more often (although not exclusively) raised with respect to the latter. In 
particular, there has been a widespread perception both by domestic and international 
policymakers that asymmetric information and contract enforcement problems may lead to a 
shortage of long-term finance.  This shortage is thought to have a cost in terms of productivity 
growth and capital accumulation and it may justify some form of government intervention. The 
setting up in most developing countries of long-term credit institutions (development banks) 
and/or of programs to foster the provision of long-term credit was indeed the policy response to 
this problem. The emphasis on long-term finance and on the potentially adverse consequences 
when it is in short supply is somewhat at odds with recent theoretical contributions that 
emphasize the fact that the use of short-term debt may be associated with higher-quality firms 
and may have better incentive properties. In particular, the possibility of premature liquidation 
may act as a discipline device that improves firms’ performance.  A re-thinking of the role of 
long-term debt, particularly when heavily subsidized, has also been prompted by the problems 
encountered in many countries by development banks in terms of non-performing loans and by 
doubts about the selection criteria used in allocating funds.    
  This paper has three goals. The first is to document the maturity structure of debt for 
Ecuadorian firms in the 1980s and early 1990s, also discussing how the maturity structure has 
                                                           
1 See Harris and Raviv (1990) for a comprehensive critical review. 
2 On the maturity choice see Myers (1977), Diamond (1991), Diamond (1993), Kale and Noe (1990), Hart and 
Moore (1994), and Barclay and Smith (1995). On the role of intermediated debt see Diamond (1984), Calomiris and 
Kahn (1991), and Rajan (1992). 
3 See also Schiantarelli and Sembenelli (1996) for a parallel analysis for the UK and Italy and Schiantarelli and 
Srivastava (1996) for India. 
  5been affected by government interventions in credit markets and by the process of financial 
liberalization that started in the mid 1980s.  The paper will not, however, have anything to say 
about the more recent period of financial turmoil in the latter part of the 1990s, since the data do 
not cover that period. Second, using firm-level panel data, the paper analyzes how access to 
long-term debt is related to various firms’ characteristics. Third, the paper provides empirical 
evidence on the impact of access to long-term debt on firms’ productivity and on capital 
accumulation.   The empirical work contained in this paper is based both on aggregate financial 
data and on micro-level data (especially the latter). The micro data consists of accounting data 
for several hundred firms collected by the Superintendencia de Compañías. 
  Although the empirical analysis provided constitutes a useful preliminary step, it must be 
emphasized that the paper does not answer the ultimate question of whether the provision of 
long-term finance should be subsidized (directly or indirectly) and, if so, which is the best way to 
provide these subsidies.  The issue is very complex because the consequences of the distortions 
generated by programs of subsidized or directed credit must be compared to the imperfections in 
the capital market due to information problems that would exist even in the absence of 
administrative controls.
4 Moreover, government intervention in promoting the supply of long-
term resources often has multiple objectives, such as redressing regional discrepancies or 
promoting greater equality in income distribution, that are not addressed in this paper.  Finally, in 
spite of this paper’s narrow focus, the data available fall short of giving definitive answers 
concerning the effects of government-supported long-term credit.  In particular one would 
optimally need detailed information at the firm level on the amount of long (and short-term) 
credit that is subsidized, together with information of terms and conditions of each loan and on 
repayment rates by type of program.  All this said, the empirical analysis of determinants and 
consequences of the maturity structure of debt provided in this paper is a useful first step that 
highlights some interesting problems and issues in the allocation of long-term debt that are 
relevant for many LDCs.     
  The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 provides a macroeconomic overview of 
the financial developments in Ecuador and of the maturity structure of debt, using aggregate 
data. Section 3 uses two different panel data sets to provide some evidence on the issue of firms’ 
                                                           
4 See Jaramillo, Schiantarelli and Weiss (1993) and (1996) on the relationship between credit allocation and firm 
characteristics and on the effects of financial constraints on investment pre and post financial liberalization. See also 
Calomiris and Himmelberg (1995) on subsidized credit in Japan.  
  6access to credit and how it relates to firms’ characteristics. Section 4 estimates both a production 
function and an investment equation to assess the impact of the maturity structure of debt on 
firms’ productivity and capital accumulation. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Maturity Structure and the Role of Subsidized Credit 
 
Until the first half of the 1980s, the Ecuadorian financial system was characterized by 
widespread regulation, including interest rate controls, directed credit programs and other 
government interference in the allocation of finance. As a result, Ecuador exhibited very poor 
measures of financial depth. For instance, the M2 to GDP ratio was low and even declined from 
20 percent in 1976 to 17 percent in 1983. One of the most important determinants of the 
weakness in mobilizing resources through the financial system was the interest rate policy 
followed in the 1970s and in the early 1980s. During this period, interest rates were fixed by the 
Government at levels at or below the inflation rate. Zero or negative real interest rates 
discouraged financial savings and limited the ability of banks to mobilize private funds. 
  However, directed credit programs from public institutions, in particular the Central 
Bank, compensated the inability of the financial system to generate funds for investment. In 
1984, these credit programs represented approximately 50 percent of the total credit in the 
economy. This explains why, despite the situation of financial repression, total credit in the 
economy increased during the 1970s and early 1980s, and peaked in 1983, when total credit 
reached 23 percent of GDP (see Figure 1 and the first two columns of Table l, reporting credit as 
a percentage of GDP and real credit growth rates).  
  Beginning in 1984, Ecuador introduced a set of reforms that gradually liberalized the 
financial market. These reforms eliminated or scaled down directed credit programs and 
removed administrative controls on interest rates. These reforms lead to an increase in real 
interest rates and improved the ability of the financial system to mobilize resources (see Figure 
2). As a result the M2 to GDP ratio increased from 17 percent in 1983 to 23 percent in 1987, 
mainly due to the introduction of the “polizas de acumulación.”  However, the supply of credit 
was drastically reduced due to the contraction of government-provided loanable funds.  As 
Figure 1 shows, total credit in the economy decreased steadily during the second half of the 
1980s and was as low as 9 percent of GDP in 1990. The main explanation for this behavior was 
the reduction of directed credit programs from public sector institutions that decreased their 
  7share in total credit from 52.7 percent in 1984 to 9 percent in 1992, as shown in Table 2. In 1988 
there was a similar setback in the process of financial deepening, reflected in a decline of M2 to 
GDP ratio. This was followed, however, by a continuation of previous improvements in the early 
1990s.  
  If one looks at the term structure of debt (see Table 1, last five columns), long-term debt 
is quantitatively much less important than short-term debt.  In the early 1980s, long-term credit 
(with maturity greater than a year) accounted for 12 percent of total debt. During the second half 
of the 1980s, its share of total debt increased to 17 percent in 1989, but dropped to 8 percent in 
1992.  Real growth rate of long-term credit was negative for most years, although short-term 
debt declined even faster. 
  It is difficult to assess exactly the role of directed credit programs in the availability of 
long-term credit. However, most programs of the Corporación Financiera Nacional (CFN) and 
Banco Nacional de Fomento (BNF), supported sectors and activities like exports (FOPEX), small 
industry (FOPINAR) and agriculture, with long-term lines of credit for the purchase of 
machinery and fixed assets. The programs financed by rediscount lines that commercial banks 
could use with the Central Bank, were instead typically short term, although it was a common 
practice to renew credit lines extended to firms.  The programs financed directly by the Central 
Bank were very important in the first half of the 1980s (89 percent of total directed credit) and 
decreased in importance throughout the 1980s and early 1990s (representing 32 percent of total 
directed credit in 1992), as shown in Table 4. The last two lines of Table 3 report the proportion 
of directed long-term credit relative to total long-term credit and the proportion of directed short- 
term credit relative to total short-term credit.   The data confirm that the percentage of directed 
credit is much higher for longer maturities. This percentage decreases from 59.3 percent in 1985 
to 35.9 percent in 1990.  It then increases to 63.4 percent and 78.7 percent in the following two 
years, in spite of the real decline in directed long-term credit, since market-provided long-term 
credit declines even faster.  The percentage of directed short-term credit decreases from 31.1 
percent in 1985 to 3.3 percent in 1992. It should be kept in mind that the last two years real total 
short-term credit expanded, following the real credit crunch at the end of the 1980s.  
  As mentioned above, at the beginning of the 1980s real (ex post) “market” lending rates 
were negative, even in the absence of subsidies. They became positive, on average, until 1987, 
and negative again in the following two years, following the earthquake and a period of fiscal 
  8laxity, resulting in a fall in the M2 to GDP ratio.  In the first half of the 1990s real rates have 
been mostly positive and increasing (see Figure 2).  Interest on directed credit programs like 
FOPEX and others administered by CFN was significantly lower than lending market rates, as 
Table 4 shows. Market rates were 1.58 times subsidized rates in 1983, 1.94 in 1988, and only 
1.19 in 1991. The spread between the two was 21.57 percentage points in 1988 and 8.82 
percentage points in 1991.  
 
3. Firm-Level Evidence on Access to Long-Term Term Debt and on Debt 
Maturity 
  
This section discusses the micro-level evidence on the maturity structure of firms’ financing. 
Two samples are used in the analysis,
5 both based on accounting data collected by the 
Superintendencia de Compañias. The first (unbalanced) sample (hereafter SC1) includes 731 
Ecuadorian manufacturing companies during the period 1984-1988 and contains more detailed 
information on firms’ real and financial variables. Moreover, for the companies in this sample it 
has been possible to identify whether they belong to an industrial group associated with a bank. 
This sample includes separate figures for short-term (non-trade) debt, long-term debt, and trade 
debt, so that the measure of length of maturity equals long-term debt divided by the sum of long- 
term debt, short-term debt and trade debt. 
   The second sample, which unfortunately cannot be linked to the first, is also derived 
from the data of the Superintendencia de Compañias, includes 850 companies and covers the 
period 1984-1992 (hereafter SC2). The period covered by this sample is longer, making it 
possible to investigate more convincingly changes in the allocation mechanism of long term 
credit, both before and after financial liberalization.  This data set, however, contains fewer and 
much more aggregate variables.  In this case there is available only data on total long-term 
liabilities; this also includes shareholders’ debt, which is quite important in smaller companies, 
and other deferred liabilities unrelated to financial or trade debt.  In this case the measure of 
length of maturity is total long-term liabilities divided by total liabilities.  
 
                                                           
5 See the Data Appendix for a description of the data. 
  93.1.  Descriptive Statistics for the Two Panels 
   
For the firms in the SC1 sample, in 1984 long-term financial debt represented 11.5 percent of 
total debt (see Table 5).  This figure is of the same order of magnitude as the one obtained from 
aggregate financial data. The share of long-term debt in total debt increased until 1987, reflecting 
the faster decline in short term debt during that period. In the SC2 sample, after 1987 there is a 
decrease in the length of maturity, as a result of the real decline in long term debt and of the real 
expansion in short term debt we have already observed at the aggregate level. 
  One striking fact regarding maturity structure is that a large number of firms appear to be 
cut-off altogether from any access to long-term debt. In the SC1 sample, which is the one to be 
used to draw inferences about access given the more detailed figures on debt, 214 firms (29.3 
percent of the total) never received long-term financial credit, 311 firms (42.5 percent of the 
total) had long-term debt during some years, while only 211 firms (28.2 percent of the total) 
always had long-term debt (see Table 6, Part I).  In the SC2 sample, which, because of the more 
aggregate nature of the debt variables is bound to present a rosier picture, 25 firms (2.9 percent 
of the total) never had long-term liabilities, 538 firms (63.3 percent) had long-term liabilities 
during some years, and 287 (33.8 percent of the total) had them during the whole period. 
  It is interesting to note that according to the SC1 sample, access to long-term financing 
improves over time (see Table 6, Part II). In 1984, only 37 percent of firms had long-term debt. 
This number increases to 59.2 percent in 1987 and decreases slightly to 58.9 percent in 1988. 
Unfortunately, the question of access in more recent years cannot be tracked because the SC2 
sample is less informative in this sense.  
  If the SC1 sample is split by size, it can be seen that access to long-term credit varies 
positively with size (see Table 7, Part I). Among the largest group of companies, 58 percent had 
long-term debt in every year of the period. Conversely, only 11 percent of the micro firms and 17 
percent of the small firms had similar access to long-term financing. Half of the micro firms and 
44 percent of the small firms never had long-term debt, while only 1.9 percent of large firms 
never had long-term debt. Similar conclusions concerning the correlation between access to 
long- term debt and size are derived from sample SC2. 
  Access to long-term credit also has a positive (simple) correlation with age: older firms 
have better access to this type of financing than younger firms, as shown in Table 7, Part II.  For 
  10instance, 35.7 percent of the youngest firms have never received long-term debt, while the figure 
is 22.7 percent for the oldest firms.  
  The relationship between access to long-term credit and bank association has also been 
explored.
6 Almost half of the firms associated with banks had long-term loans during the whole 
period. In contrast, only 25 percent of the firms with no bank association had regular access to 
long-term financing (see Table 7, Part III). It is important to mention that older firms and 
companies with bank association are usually the larger ones. 
  Finally, Table 8 investigates the association between the maturity structure of liabilities 
and other firms’ characteristics, for the SC1 and the SC2 sample respectively. The first three 
columns of the table continue to divide firms among those who never, sometimes, and always 
had access to long-term debt. The last three columns divide the firm-year observations according 
to whether maturity is below the median, between the median and the third quartile, and above 
the third quartile. Obviously, the share of long-term credit to total credit is higher in companies 
that always had long-term financing compared to the rest. Firms that always had long term debt, 
are larger, judging by their mean or median real capital stock or real sales, more leveraged, with 
a higher proportion of fixed assets to total assets, more profitable and more dynamic, judging by 
the real sales growth rate. However, the investment rate (the ratio of investment to the capital 
stock) is lower for this group of firms. The ratio of liquid assets to total capital is no different for 
firms that never had access to long-term credit and those that always had it, although it is higher 
for companies that have had long term financing during some years.  The results obtained when 
firms are divided according to quartiles are similar with two interesting exceptions. First, the 
(operating) profit rate is the lowest for the group with a maturity length in the top quartile 
relative to the other firms.  Second, the liquid asset to total asset ratio seems to be monotonically 
decreasing with maturity.  The results for the SC1 and the SC2 sample are very similar. The only 
difference is that profit is always positively correlated both to the access and length of maturity. 
 
3.2. Econometric Evidence on Access and Maturity  
 
This subsection discusses some of the econometric evidence on access to long-term debt. Table 9 
reports in the first two columns the results obtained using probit and logit models for the 
                                                           
6 Bank association was defined whenever management or important shareholders of manufacturing firms were also 
members of the Board of Directors of a financial institution. 
  11probability of obtaining long term credit for the SC1 sample. In order to take into account the 
panel data nature of the data, the last two columns also report the results for the probit random 
effects model (see Butler and Moffit, 1982) and for the fixed effect logit model (see 
Chamberlain, 1980). In order to minimize endogeneity problems, at least in the logit models with 
fixed effects, all regressors have been included as beginning of period (if stocks) or last period 
values (if flows). All equations in this subsection include also sector and year dummies (not 
reported here for the sake of brevity), with the exception of the logit model with fixed effects, 
which includes only year dummies.  Although the significance of the coefficient varies across 
estimators, the direction of the effects of the various variables is in most cases consistent across 
estimators.  One of the clearest results is that size (proxied here by the logarithm of the real 
capital stock at the beginning of the period, LRKAP1) is very important in determining access to 
long-term credit. More specifically, the probability of obtaining long-term credit is greater for 
larger firms. This result is consistent with one of the predictions in the model by Diamond 
(1991), which shows that for firms with low credit ratings (presumably the small firms in this 
case), an increase in quality is associated with gaining access to long-term debt.
7 In his model the 
basic trade-off is between the benefits of short-term debt, because it allows firms to take 
advantage of favorable news certain, and the liquidation risk they have to bear, since 
opportunistic lenders may try to appropriate the surplus by forcing the firm into bankruptcy.  
However, great caution is needed before linking the empirical results for Ecuador to the 
theoretical models that have been proposed in the literature.  One problem is that lenders are 
assumed to be profit maximizing in the model, which may or may not be an accurate assumption 
for Ecuadorian intermediaries in their role of providers of directed credit.  
  Since the real value of fixed assets has been used as a proxy for size, the positive effect of 
size also reflects the fact that the availability of collateral is a prerequisite to obtain long-term 
debt. Finally, the positive effect of the size variable could capture the greater economic and 
political bargaining power by large firms in obtaining long-term directed credit. 
  Other than size, no other firm characteristic has a statistically significant coefficient at 
conventional levels in the fixed effect logit equation, although the direction of the effects is 
identical to that in the other models. The lack of precision in the coefficient estimates in the fixed 
                                                           
7 See Schiantarelli and Sembenelli (1996) for a more detailed discussion of the theoretical models of maturity 
choice. 
  12effect logit model should not be too surprising; estimation of the conditional likelihood function 
implies a loss of efficiency, since many observations drop out from the (conditional) likelihood 
(see Chamberlain, 1980 for details).   
  Given size, past operating profits as a proportion of total assets (fixed capital plus 
inventories plus liquid assets), CFK1 does not have a statistically significant effect on access to 
long-term debt in any equation (actually the point estimate is always negative). One has to 
remember that the larger firms in the panel are more profitable than smaller ones. However, it is 
somewhat worrisome from the point of view of the allocation of directed credit that, conditional 
on size, profits do not matter in determining access to long-term credit. 
  Association with a business group  with bank links, captured by the dummy variable 
BAND, is not a significant determinant of access, either. This is somewhat surprising, since 
members of business groups may be thought to have superior clout in accessing financial 
resources, in addition to being informationally less disadvantaged.  Similarly, all else being 
equal, the age of the firm (summarized by the AGE2 to AGE4 dummies in deviation from the 
youngest firms) is not a significant determinant of access. The explanation for both these results 
may be that the effect of bank association or age is basically subsumed by the size variable, 
given the high probability that larger firms are group members and, at the same time, older. 
  The overall past degree of leverage, LEV1, is positively related to access to long-term 
debt. Past access to both short term and long term debt may work here as a predictor of the 
ability to obtain long-term debt (more on the role of leverage below). The initial stock of liquid 
assets, LASK1, does not play, instead, a statistically significant role.  
  Table 10 reports the results for the SC1 sample from estimating a sample selection model 
for the length of debt maturity, using standard two-step procedures. The dependent variable is 
long-term debt as a proportion of total debt, including trade debt, MAT. The results reported are 
those obtained when either a probit model or a logit model is used in the first step.  The 
coefficient of cash flow in the maturity equation is negative, which emphasizes the concerns 
expressed above regarding criteria for the allocation of long-term directed credit in Ecuador.  
Paralleling the results for the access, the length of maturity is positively and significantly related 
to lagged leverage. As explained above, this latter result may reflect the fact that having obtained 
debt in the past is an indication of the ability to obtain long-term debt in the future. It is also 
consistent with the idea that higher leverage increases the risk of liquidation and makes long- 
  13term debt more attractive for firms. The length of maturity is also positively associated with size, 
but the association is not very significant. 
  There is also evidence of a very strong and positive association between lagged asset 
maturity (proxied here by the ratio between fixed capital and the sum of fixed capital (estimated) 
inventories and liquid assets, ASS1). This is consistent with the idea that firms tend to match the 
maturity structure of assets and liabilities, as implied by the conventional wisdom and as 
predicted by the more formal model by Hart and More (1994). It is also consistent with the 
hypothesis that fixed assets may be a better form of collateral for long term debt, so that their 
availability is associated with longer maturity of debt.  Finally the growth of real sales, 
GYREAL1, has a positive but not significant effect on maturity. 
  One important issue that deserves to be investigated is whether changes have occurred 
over time in the determinants of access to long-term credit and, conditional on having access, on 
the maturity structure of debt. In particular, it would be useful to know whether financial 
liberalization has introduced any change in the allocation mechanism of long-term debt. The 
longer SC2 sample has been used to obtain some evidence on this issue.
8 Table 11 reports the 
results obtained estimating the sample selection model for the SC1 sample. After some 
experimentation, the coefficients on lagged operating profits as a proportion of total assets 
(PROF1) and on the lagged value of the logarithm of real assets (LRTA1) have been allowed to 
vary before and after liberalization, both in the access and maturity equation (in Table 12 LD is a 
dummy variable that equals one from 1989 onward).
9  The results suggest that the probability of 
having access to long term debt before financial liberalization is positively related to size and 
leverage and negatively related to profits. These results are similar to those obtained for the SC1 
sample. The main difference is that the profit variable is now negative and significant (it was not 
significant for the SC1 sample), making even stronger the concerns on the criteria used to 
allocate long term directed credit. The coefficient on profits increases significantly after 
liberalization, but it remains negative. The increase in the value of the coefficient may reflect the 
fact that financial intermediaries start paying more attention at accounting measures of firms’ 
credit rating after financial liberalization.  This would also be confirmed by the fact that the 
                                                           
8  In order to investigate the effect of financial liberalization, it would have been desirable to be able to link the two 
samples in order to cover a longer data period, both pre and post liberalization. As explained above, this is not 
possible. 
  14(positive) coefficient of the log of total real assets is significantly and substantially larger after 
financial reform, which is consistent with a greater importance of collateral.   The negativity of 
the coefficient also in the post reform period could be explained by the fact that better (more 
profitable) firms prefer to use short-term credit in order to take advantage of future disclosure of 
positive information, as suggested by Diamond (1991) for the firms at the upper end of the 
quality spectrum. However, there is also another possible explanation for this result.  As 
indicated above, although the real supply of long term directed credit continues to decrease in 
1991 and 1992, market-provided long-term credit shrinks even faster. As a result the share of 
directed credit in total long-term credit provided to firm increases, and it is possible that the 
allocation of this portion of long-term credit remains problematic in more recent years. 
  The sign and magnitude of the profit coefficients in the second stage maturity equation 
parallel those in the probit equation and, therefore, the arguments immediately above will not be 
repeated.  Size does not play a significant role in the maturity equation, while the maturity 
composition of assets and the degree of leverage both have a significantly positive effect on the 
length of the maturity structure of debt.   
 
4. Maturity and Performance 
 
This section discusses the effect of the maturity structure of debt on firms’ performance. More 
specifically, two main issues are addressed. The first is whether the availability of long-term 
finance allows firms to improve their productivity. The second is whether the availability of 
long- term finance stimulates capital accumulation by firms. There are at least two reasons why 
access to long-term debt may improve firms’ productivity. On the one hand, it may allow firms 
access to better and more productive technologies, which the firm may be reluctant to finance 
with short-term debt because of fears of liquidation. On the other, lack of availability of long 
term finance may put a squeeze on working capital, and this may have adverse consequences on 
productivity. The other side of the coin is that short-term debt, if it entails more continuous 
monitoring, may force firms to reduce inefficiencies and to increase productivity at each level of 
measurable inputs (capital stock, number of workers, materials).  Ultimately the issue is an 
empirical one. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
9 Although financial liberalization started in 1984, it is a lengthy process that has included setbacks. Similar results 
were obtained with different breaking points. 
  15  In Table 12 a standard Cobb-Douglas production function is estimated, with capital, labor 
and materials, for the SC1 sample, the only one for which the necessary data are available.  The 
logarithm of the real value of sales, LRY, is used as a proxy for output. LRN denotes the log of 
employment, LRK the log of the real value of fixed assets, and LRM the real value of material 
used in production.  In addition, total factor productivity to depends upon the maturity structure 
of debt and also on the overall degree of leverage. One potential reason for the inclusion of 
leverage is that financial pressure may force the firm and its managers to be more efficient.
10  
However, it is possible that with more leveraging, controlling shareholders may have a smaller 
incentive to strive for efficiency, since they reap a smaller fraction of the rewards. Different 
specifications of the equations are estimated in terms of their dynamic structure. All equations 
are estimated by GMM after taking first differences (see Arellano and Bond, 1992).
11 The first 
difference transformation removes the firm-specific and time-invariant components of the error 
term. Removal of the firm-specific component of the error term is important in order to prevent 
the coefficient of maturity from merely capturing the fact that better firms may simply receive 
more long-term debt. Lagged values (two or more periods) of the regressors and of the dependent 
variable are used as instruments to account for potential endogeneity of the regressors, either 
because the variables are decided jointly with production or because there are measurement 
errors.  The equations also contain year dummies.  The table further reports the test of over-
identifying restrictions (denoted here as the Sargan test), distributed as chi-squared, and tests for 
first and second-order serial correlation (m1 and m2 respectively), distributed as a standardized 
normal. 
  The results suggest that, when beginning of period maturity together with beginning of 
period leverage is added to the static version of the production function, there is no statistically 
significant effect on productivity.  When maturity and leverage are entered as end of period 
variables, the effect of maturity is positive and almost significant, while the leverage effect is 
virtually zero. When the leverage variable is excluded from the equation, the effect of maturity 
becomes significant. Still the test of over-identifying restrictions of all the specifications 
illustrated so far suggests that there is some form of mis-specification. One such form of mis-
specification, namely dynamic mis-specification, has been explored. The production function has 
                                                           
10 See also Nickell and Nicolitsas (1995) for an analysis using UK panel data. 
11 The DPD program by Arellano and Bond (1988) is used for estimation. 
  16therefore been re-estimated, including the lagged value of the dependent variable and 
contemporaneous and lagged values of all the regressors (financial and real). This model can be 
interpreted as the unrestricted version of a model in which the dynamics are generated by an 
autoregressive error term of order one.  The results are reported in the last column of the table. 
Now the equation passes the test of over-identifying restrictions. Again, contemporaneous 
maturity has a positive effect on productivity, while the leverage effects are insignificant. 
  What is the impact of the maturity structure of debt and fixed capital accumulation? This 
issue is investigated by estimating an augmented accelerator type of investment function, where 
the investment rate, IK, is a function of its own lagged value, of the contemporaneous and once 
lagged rate of growth in real sales, GYR, past cash flow (net of interest rate payments), CFKN, 
leverage, LEV, and maturity, MAT. All the coefficients have been allowed to differ across small 
and large firms (S denotes small and L large in the variables’ definition).
12  The results, obtained 
using the GMM estimator, are reported in Table 13.  As one would expect if capital market 
imperfections are more important for smaller firms than for larger firms, the coefficient is greater 
and more significant for the former. The other financial variables, leverage and maturity, do not 
appear to play an important role, and are not significant at conventional levels, whether they are 
included contemporaneously or once lagged.  When their contemporaneous values are used as 
regressors, there is some weak evidence of a positive association between maturity and 
investment, but only for large firms (t = 1.58), while for small firms the association is actually 




Several lessons emerge from the empirical analysis of the maturity structure of debt in Ecuador.  
The most striking fact is the very unequal distribution of the maturity structure of debt. This is 
summarized by the fact that, at one end of the spectrum, almost 30 percent of all firms never 
have access to long-term credit during the period covered by the richer panel presented here. At 
the other end of the spectrum, almost 30 percent of all firms always have some long-term debt 
among their liabilities.  The main determinant of the probability of obtaining long-term credit is a 
firm’s size (proxied by the real value of the fixed assets). This positive association is consistent 
with several explanations.  One is simply that the availability of collateral is a prerequisite for 
  17obtaining long-term credit. Moreover, since larger firms in Ecuador tend to be more profitable, 
this result could also reflect the positive association between firm quality and access to long-term 
credit. Finally, larger firms are likely to have better bargaining power and greater political 
influence in obtaining long-term financial resources.  
  One disturbing additional result is that, conditional on size, operating profits either do not 
increase the probability of receiving long-term credit or may actually decrease it.  Moreover, 
conditional on having obtained access, they are negatively correlated with the length of the 
maturity structure of debt. This raises some questions on the mechanism used in allocating long- 
term financial resources in Ecuador during the period under examination.  
  It is interesting to note that the negative effect of profits is greater before financial 
liberalization, suggesting that the allocation problem was particularly severe for directed credit. 
After financial liberalization, the coefficient on profit increases, but not quite enough to make it 
positive. The increase is consistent with the presence of greater incentives for banks to pay more 
attention to accounting measures of firms’ credit ratings.  This would also be confirmed by the 
fact that the (positive) coefficient of the log of total real assets is significantly and substantially 
larger after financial reform, which is consistent with a greater importance of collateral.  The 
negativity of the profit coefficient also in the post-reform period could be explained by the fact 
that better (more profitable) firms prefer to use short-term credit. Alternatively, it could be due to 
the fact that allocation problems still remained in the early 1990s for long-term directed credit, 
which, in spite of its real contraction, increased as a share of total long term credit in 1991 and 
1992, due to the even faster real decrease in the supply of market provided credit. 
  The data also suggest that there is a strong positive association between asset maturity 
and debt maturity. This matching of assets and liabilities confirms both the conventional wisdom 
and the theoretical models that can be used to rationalize it. 
  Does the availability of long-term finance make a difference to a firm’s performance, 
either in terms of productivity or of capital accumulation?  With respect to productivity, does 
long-term credit facilitate access to more productive technologies or does the less intense 
monitoring and the lesser fear of liquidation associated with long term debt actually reduce 
productivity?  The results obtained from estimating an augmented production function are quite 
unequivocal in suggesting that a shorter maturity is not conducive to greater productivity.   
                                                                                                                                                                                           
12 Firms are classified as large if their fixed capital stock exceeds $6 million at 1975 prices. 
  18Moreover there is some evidence that long-term debt may actually lead to productivity 
improvements.  Although these results suggest that long-term debt may have a positive impact 
on the quality of capital accumulation, estimation of an investment equation does not show a 
large and significant impact of the maturity structure of debt on the amount of fixed investment. 
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  21DATA APPENDIX 
   
The empirical research is based on information collected by the “Superintendencia de 
Compañías”(SC) of Ecuador. The SC is a government agency that controls corporate activities. 
By law, all firms have to submit balance sheet and profit and losses information to the SC in 
order to do business in Ecuador and in order to obtain credit (official loans, as well as regular 
credit), tax identification numbers, and other legal requirements. 
  The balance sheets also include, together with the standard items, information on 
reevaluations of assets allowed by the Government to account for inflation and exchange rate 
depreciation. The capital stock measure is the revalued one and it includes plant and machinery, 
buildings and others (excluding land). 
We use two samples in the analysis. Both of them are based on data accounting collected by the 
SC. 
  The first (unbalanced) sample (SC1) includes 731 Ecuadorian manufacturing companies 
during the period 1984 - 1988, out of which 366 firms have data for the full five year period. It 
contains detailed information on firms’ real and financial variables. All the variables used in the 
paper are the ones derived from the balance sheets or profit and loss account. The only exception 
is the figure for the stock of inventories that has been computed by multiplying the firm level 
sale figure by the industry wide inventory to sales ratio in each year. 
  The second sample (SC2), after eliminating firms with missing, unacceptable, or 
inconsistent data, or firms not engaged in production activities, consists of 850 firms with 
complete information available the period 1982-1992. Even though this sample is longer and 
more recent, it contains more aggregate and therefore fewer variables. 


























By Size          
Micro  28  3.83% 28  3.83% 212  24.94%  212  24.94% 
Small  216  29.55% 244  33.38% 213  25.06% 425  50.00% 
Medium  355  48.56% 599  81.94% 213  25.06% 638  75.06% 
Large  132 18.06%  731 100.00% 212 24.94%  850 100.00%
By Age          
Youngest  171  23.39% 171  23.39% 282  33.18% 282  33.18% 
Young  260  35.57% 431  58.96% 456  53.65% 738  86.82% 
Old  150  20.52% 581  79.48% 92  10.82% 830  97.65% 
Oldest  150 20.52%  731 100.00% 20  2.35%  850 100.00%
By Sector          
31: Food and 
Beverages 
143  19.60% 143  19.60% 189  22.20% 189  22.20% 
32:  Textiles  111  15.18% 254  34.78% 132  15.50% 320  37.70% 
33:  Lumber  45  6.10% 299  40.88%  41  4.80% 361  42.50% 
34: Paper and printing  73  9.99%  372  50.87%  78  9.20%  439  51.70% 
35:  Chemicals  139  19.02% 511  69.89% 170  20.00% 609  71.70% 
36: Metallic minerals  43  5.88% 554  75.77%  49  5.80% 659  77.50% 
37: Nonmetallic 
minerals 
19  2.60% 573  78.37%  23  2.70% 682  80.20% 
38:  Machinery  144  19.70% 717  98.07% 145  17.00% 826  97.20% 
39:  Others  14  1.92% 731  99.98%  24  2.80% 850  100.00%
 
Notes for SC1: Definition of size by capital stock in the initial year: Micro US$ 2000 < K; Small: US$ 2000 < 
K < US$ 40000; Medium: US$ 40000< K < US$ 600000; Large K > US$ 600000. K : machinery, plant and 
equipment, other (excluding land); K is valued at 1975 US Dollars. Definition of age: youngest: born after 
1980; young: born between 1970 and 1980; old born between 1960 and 1970; oldest: born before 1960. 
 
Notes for SC2: Definition of Size in initial year: Micro if real value of total assets < Sucres 2478 ; Small if 
Sucres 2478 < Real value of total assets < Sucres 9022; Medium if Sucres 9022 < real value of total assets< 
Sucres 32868; large if real value of total assets > Sucres 32868. All values at 1982 prices. 
Definition of age: youngest 15 years old, young born between 15 and 30 years of age; old born between 30 and 

















Source: Banco Central del Ecuador, Información Estadística Mensual, various issues. 
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  Source: Banco Central del Ecuador, Información Estadística Mensual, various issues. 
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Table 1. Evolution of Aggregate Debt 
Year  Total debt  Short term (< 1 year)  Long term (> 1 year)  Long term debt 
  % of GDP  Growth rate (real)  % of GDP  Growth rate (real)  % of GDP  Growth rate (real) Total debt 
1980  14.6%  -    na      - na - na
1981              15.5%  10.7% na na na na na
1982                18.2% 18.7% na na na na na
1983                23.1% 23.4% na na na na na
1984                21.2% -4.4% 18.5% na 2.7% na 12.6%
1985                19.4% -4.7% 16.6% -6.3% 2.8% 6.9% 14.4%
1986                18.3% -2.9% 16.1% -0.3% 2.2% -18.9% 12.1%
1987              18.2% -6.0% 15.8% -7.0% 2.4% 1.8%  13.3%
1988  12.5%              -24.3% 10.5% -26.2% 2.0% -11.2% 16.0%
1989                10.0% -20.0% 8.2% -22.5% 1.7% -5.4% 17.2%
1990  9.1%              -5.9% 7.6% -5.3% 1.5% -8.5% 16.8%
1991                10.7% 22.9% 9.7% 33.8% 1.0% -31.1% 9.4%
1992                10.9% 5.8% 10.0% 7.5% 0.9% -10.8% 7.9%
1993      14.4% 35.0% na  na  na  na  na 
1994                20.4% 47.1% na na na na na
1995                25.0% 25.9% na na na na na
 
Source:  Source: Banco Central del Ecuador, Información Estadística Mensual, various issues and   Superintendencia de Bancos, Memorias, several issues. 
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Table 2. Directed Credit Programs (aggregate figures) 
 






1984 52.7%   
1985 35.2%  -37.1% 
1986 29.0%  -15.0% 
1987 21.4%  -26.3% 
1988 27.7%  22.6% 
1989 17.9%  -41.4% 
1990 16.1%  -15.4% 
1991 12.5%  -8.3% 
1992 9.2% -26.8% 
 
                             Source: Superintendencia de Bancos, “Memorias,” several issues. 
 
 
      Table 3. Directed Credit Programs (by type of program) 
 
  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992 
CFN    5,932  11,223 18,236 17,349 30,772 37,089 56,212 81,031 
   Agriculture.  na   764  1,218  2,424  2,940  5,735  3,960  10,423  9,529 
   Manufacture   na   5,036  9,102  14,907  13,541  24,610  32,720  43,028  66,590 
   Construction   na     20  24           
   Commerce   na   109  546  642  646  283  283  733  4,317 
   Transport.   na   23  195  85    35  35  1,727  109 
   Financial   na           43  43  52  3 
   Services   na     82  154  222  67  50  125  110 
   Others   na     61          124  374 
BNF  22,971 37,376 42,854 47,549 59,280 87,279 132,546  226,238  366,345 
      Agriculture  16,061 25,882 32,595 31,456 39,172 59,106 96,732 159,702  261,848 
   Small industry.  2,641  3,704  3,376  5,880  6,250  9,440  12,731  19,506  28,448 
   Fishery  599  523  611  1,286  1,303  3,196  2,831  7,241  10,261 
      Transportation  1,670 4,048 1,216 1,321 1,876 2,275 2,358 4,232 8,388 
      Tourism  98  323 249 312 242 418 476 1,110  1,176 
   Commerce  1,902  2,897  4,808  7,294  10,440  12,845  17,418  34,447  56,224 
Central  Bank  194,304 135,583 129,629 121,032 194,221 230,723 284,326 311,840 215,723 
Total  217,276 178,890 183,706 186,817 270,850 348,774 453,961 594,290 663,098 
%  of  CFN  n.a  3.3% 6.1% 9.8% 6.4% 8.8% 8.2% 9.5% 12.2% 
%  of  BNF  10.6% 20.9% 23.3% 25.5% 21.9% 25.0% 29.2% 38.1% 55.2% 
%  of  BCE  89.4% 75.8% 70.6% 64.8% 71.7% 66.2% 62.6% 52.5% 32.5% 
(BNF+CFN) 
long term credit 
  59.3% 70.8% 56.7% 38.0% 35.0% 35.9% 63.4% 78.7% 
        BCE        . 
short term credit 
  31.1% 23.3% 16.0% 18.4% 14.3% 12.1% 7.3%  3.3% 
 
       Source: Superintendencia de Bancos, Memorias, various issues. 
 
  26             Table 4. Interest Rates on Directed Credit Programs and Market Rates 
  (1) FOPEX and 




Size of the subsidy 
 (2)/(1) 
1983 12  19  1.58 
1984 18  23  1.28 
1985 18  25.6  1.42 
1986 18  30.7  1.71 
1987 23  38.79  1.69 
1988 23  44.57  1.94 
1989 32  49.16  1.54 
1990 39  53.09  1.36 
1991 47  55.82  1.19 
   





Table 5. Long-Term Debt/Total Debt 
  Aggregate data  SC1 Sample (*)  SC2 Sample (**) 
1984  12.6% 11.5% 27% 
1985  14.4% 13.8% 27% 
1986  12.1% 17.7% 28% 
1987  13.3% 19.1% 28% 
1988  16.0% 17.0% 27% 
1989 17.2%  na  25% 
1990 16.8%  na  25% 
1991 9.4% na  25% 
1992 7.9% na  20% 
 
(*)           Long term credit          .      (**) Long term liabilities 
      Long term + short term + trade debt            Total liabilities 
 
  27   Table 6. Access to Long-Term Debt 
PART I: Over the entire period   
  SC1 sample    SC2 sample    
  No. of firms  %  No. of firms  % 
Never 214  29.3%  25  2.9% 
Some  311 42.5%  538 63.3% 
Always  206 28.2%  287 33.8% 
Total  731 100%  850 100% 
PART II: Firms with positive long-term debt, by year   
  SC1 sample     SC2 sample    
 No.  of 
observations 




% of total 
observations 
1984  171 37.1%  623 73.3% 
1985  226 42.5%  617 72.6% 
1986  307 56.0%  649 76.4% 
1987  381 59.2%  658 77.4% 
1988  362 58.9%  657 77.3% 
1989 na  na    649  76.4% 
1990  na na 668  78.6% 
1991  na na 654  76.9% 
1992  na na 584  68.7% 
Total  1447 51.7%  6996 74.8% 
    Source: Data appendix 
 
  28     Table 7. Access to Long-Term Debt 
PART I: By size   
  SC1 sample    SC2 sample   
  No. of firms  %  No. of firms  % 
Smallest  28 100%  212  100% 
Never  14 50%  16 7.5% 
Some 11  39.3%  161  75.9% 
Always 3  10.7%  35  16.5% 
Small  216 100%  213 100% 
Never 94  43.5%  5  2.3% 
Some 86  39.8%  157  73.7% 
Always  36 16.7%  51 23.9% 
Large  355 100%  213 100% 
Never 94  26.5%  4  1.9% 
Some  165 46.5%  133 62.4% 
Always  96 27%  71 35.7% 
Largest  132 100%  212 100% 
Never 12  9.1%  0  0% 
Some  49 37.1%  87 41% 
Always 71  53.8%  125  59% 
PART II: By age   
  SC1 sample    SC2 sample   
  No. of firms  %  No. of firms  % 
Youngest  171 100%  282 100% 
Never 61  35.7%  9  3.2% 
Some 66  38.6%  194  68.8% 
Always  44 25.7%  79 28.0% 
Young  260 100%  456 100% 
Never  82 31.5%  14 3.1% 
Some  112 43.1%  285 62.5% 
Always 66  25.4%  157  34.4% 
Old  150 100%  92  100% 
Never 34  22.7%  2  2.2% 
Some  69 46.0%  47 51.1% 
Always  47 31.3%  43 46.7% 
Oldest  150 100%  20  100% 
Never 37  24.7%  0  0% 
Some  64 42.7%  12 60% 
Always 49  32.6%  8  40% 
PART III: By bank association   
  SC1 sample    SC2 sample   
  No. of firms  %  No. of firms  % 
Not associated  606 100%  na  na 
Never 184  30.4%  na  na 
Some 268  44.2%  na  na 
Always 154  25.4%  na  na 
Associated  109 100%  na  na 
Never 19  17.4%  na  na 
Some 40  36.7%  na  na 
Always 50  45.9%  na    na 
Unknown  16 100%  na na 
Never 11  68.8%  na  na 
Some 3  18.8%  na  na 
Always 2  12.4%  na  na 
      Source: see Data appendix. 
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Table 8. Long-Term Debt and Other Firm Characteristics 
PART I: SC1 sample    
  Mean value of characteristics  Mean values of characteristics 







Maturity (Long term debt/total debt)  0.000  0.165  0.324  0.023  0.179  0.430 
Leverage (Total debt/total capital)  0.505  0.603  0.644  0.563  0.616  0.605 
Liquid assets/total capital  0.069  0.083  0.067  0.080  0.077  0.062 
Clients/total capital  0.236  0.227  0.213  0.254  0.221  0.173 
Fixed assets/total capital  0.534  0.540  0.598  0.504  0.559  0.650 
Sales (real growth rate)  0.044  0.066  0.067  0.053  0.059  0.078 
Operating surplus/capital stock  0.120  0.151  0.152  0.150  0.152  0.120 
Investment/Capital stock  0.241  0.226  0.214  0.238  0.212  0.223 
Capital stock (millions of 1975 sucres)  1.386  3.027  7.184  2.224  4.479  3.824 
Sales (millions of 1975 sucres)  5.486  10.706  18.145  9.571  14.190  8.074 
PART II: sc2 sample 
  Mean value of characteristics  Mean value of characteristics 







Long term liabilities/total liabilities  00  0.22  0.35  0.04  0.29  0.65 
Total liabilities/total assets  0.31  0.54  0.59  0.35  0.64  0.84 
Liquid assets/total assets  0.47  0.44  0.43  0.14  0.61  0.85 
Profits/total  assets  2.212  22.135 62.255 -0.2  0.5  0.14 
Total assets (millions of 1975 sucres)  2.212  22.135 62.255 2.457  15.054  120.437 
     





  30 Table 9. Econometric Analysis of Determinants of Access to Long-Term Debt 
 (SC1 sample) 
 













fixed  effects 
AGE2 0.03  0.00  0.05   
 (0.38)  (0.00)  (0.37)   
AGE3 -0.04  -0.13 -0.07  
 -(0.49)  -(0.58)  -(0.44)   
AGE4 -0.13  -0.34 -0.21  
 -(1.32)  -(1.49)  -(1.31)   
BAND -0.05  -0.01  -0.10   
 -(0.60)  -(0.04)  -(0.67)   
LASK1 0.51  1.32  0.78  2.72 
 (1.59)  (2.41)  (1.46)  (2.39) 
LEV1 0.44  0.53  0.72  0.13 
 (6.28)  (4.73)  (6.16)  (0.39) 
CFK1 -0.20  -0.46 -0.33 -0.58 
 -(0.94)  -(1.19)  -(0.93)  -(0.60) 
LRKAP1 0.29  0.50  0.48  0.58 
 (12.99)  (9.32)  (12.56)  (1.86) 
RHO    0.68    
  (10.47)     
￿2   314.417 353.626  314.045   
  (p-value) (0.0000)  (0.0000) (0.0000)  
Nobs  2069 2069  2069  1869 
Nfirms  731 731  731  531 
 
Note: year and industry dummies included.  
 
  31                   Table 10. Length of Maturity Equation (SC1 sample) 






AGE2 -0.01  -0.02 
 (-0.33)  (-0.94) 
AGE3 -0.04  -0.04 
 (-1.00)  (-1.65) 
AGE4 -0.05  -0.04 
 (-1.11)  (-1.56) 
BAND -0.01  0.01 
 (-0.18)  (0.46) 
ASS1 0.29  0.30 
 (5.91)  (8.03) 
LEV1 0.12  0.05 
 (2.07)  (1.93) 
CFK1 -0.20  -0.19 
 (-2.14)  (-3.27) 
GYREAL1 0.29  0.03 
 (1.26)  (1.67) 
LRKAP1 0.04  0.01 
  (1.26)  (0.43) 
LASK1 0.28  0.27 
 (1.99)  (3.08) 
LAMBDA 0.50  0.18 
  (2.41) (3.05) 
F-stat 10.14  10.02 
 (p-value)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Nobs (positive) 1.140  1140 
Nfirms  731 731 
 
                  Note: year and industry dummies included. 
 
  32               Table 11. Sample Selection Model for Access 
   to the Long-Term Debt and Maturity Equation 
               (SC2 sample) 
 
 PROBIT  TWO  STAGE  HECKIT 
AGE2 -0.13  -0.02 
 (-3.57)  (-1.73) 
AGE3 -0.01  0.04 
 (-0.16)  (2.54) 
AGE4 -0.22  0.02 
 (-1.83)  (0.95) 
PROF1 -2.23  -0.82 
 (-6.74)  (-8.30) 
PROF1*LD 1.22  0.67 
 (3.03)  (6.10) 
LRTA1 0.064  -0.00 
 (7.89)  (-1.74) 
LRTA1*LD 0.24  0.00 
 (16.17)  (0.22) 
LEV1 0.73  0.26 
 (9.52)  (11.97) 
ASS1    0.28 
    (14.19) 
LAMBDA   0.40 
  (9.08) 
￿2   1115.48    
  (0.00)    
F-stat   30.77 
 (p-value)    (0.00) 
Nobs  8060  
Nobs (positive)   6113 
Nfirms  731 731 
  
                                   Note: Year and industry dummies included. 
 



















Constant -0.03  -0.04  -0.04  -0.04 
 -(3.65)  -(4.08)  -(4.57)  -(2.60) 
LRY1       0.41 
       (3.23) 
LRM 0.46  0.38  0.39  0.36 
  (8.61)  (6.64) (6.96)  (5.51) 
LRM1       -0.15 
       -(1.98) 
LRK 0.08  0.05  0.05  0.15 
  (2.05) (1.00)  (1.07)  (2.18) 
LRK1       -0.11 
       -(1.55) 
LRN1       -0.08 
       -(1.75) 
LRN 0.42  0.45  0.46  0.42 
 (6.64)  (6.24)  (6.87)  (3.33) 
MAT -0.03  0.16  0.18  0.35 
  -(1.16) (1.70)  (2.28)  (2.04) 
MAT1       -0.096 
       -(1.58) 
LEV   0.01    0.02 
   (0.22)    (0.198) 
LEV1 -0.005      -0.001 
 -(0.24)      -(0.03) 
D87 -0.03  -0.03  -0.03  -0.016 
 -(3.77)  -(3.01)  -(3.18)  -(0.93) 
D88 -0.05  -0.04  -0.04  -0.024 
 -(5.52)  -(3.25)  -(3.44)  -(1.23) 
Wald [df]  206.30[5]  169.66[5]  183.52[4]  172.50[11] 
 (p-value)  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Sargan [df]  64.82[31]  56.89[31] 59.20[32]  19.90[25] 
 (p-value)  0.000 0.003  0.002  0.752 
M1 -3.543  -2.714  -3.488  -4.642 
 (p-value)  0.000 0.007  0.000  0.000 
M2 -1.277  -0.766  -0.761  0.089 
 (p-value)  0.202 0.444  0.447  0.929 
 




 first differences 
 (1) 
GMM 
 first differences 
 (3) 
Constant 0.02  0.02 
 (2.18)  (1.34) 
IK1S 0.11  0.09 
 (2.25)  (1.75) 
IK1L 0.07  0.08 
  (1.67)  (1.52) 
CFKN1S 0.24  0.24 
 (2.37)  (2.33) 
CFKN1L 0.14  0.17 
  (1.69) (1.85) 
GYR1S 0.04  0.03 
  (1.88) (1.59) 
GYR1L -0.01  -0.005 
 -(0.82)  -(0.23) 
GYRS   0.05 
   (0.65) 
GYRL   -0.14 
   -(1.55) 
MATS   -0.20 
   -(1.73) 
MATL   0.15 
   (1.58) 
MAT1S -0.09   
 -(1.09)   
MAT1L 0.05   
  (1.04)  
LEV1S -0.0007  -0.02 
 -(0.01)  -(0.34) 
LEV1L -0.002  0.03 
 -(0.05)  (0.72) 
D87 -0.01  -0.003 
 -(0.58)  -(0.156) 
D88 -0.05  -0.035 
 -(3.2)  -(2.22) 
Wald [df]  29.40[10]  33.48[12] 
 (p-value)  0.001  0.001 
Sargan [df]  64.49[50]  54.70[48] 
 (p-value)  0.082 0.227 
M1 -9.325  -8.725 
 (p-value)  0.000 0.000 
M2 0.712  0.596 
 (p-value)  0.477 0.551 
 
  35